The predicament of Iranian strategy: When doctrine reproduces crisis

Amid the recent regional escalation and Iranian attacks on the Gulf, much is said about Iran: is it a troubled ideological regime, or a state seeking survival at any cost? Yet this question, in its simplified form, misleads more than it clarifies. Iran today can only be understood as a national security state—one that views the world through the lens of threats and constructs its policies on that basis above all other considerations.

This security-oriented outlook is not incidental; rather, it is the product of a long history of shocks and interventions that have deepened mistrust in the international system and instilled a firm conviction that reliance on external actors constitutes an existential risk. From this perspective, “resistance” does not appear merely as an ideological slogan, but as a framework used to justify expansionist policies under the guise of survival. Through this lens, the behavior of the Iranian regime in the region—including toward the Gulf states—becomes intelligible

Iran, as it sees itself, operates in an unreliable environment, without permanent allies. This perception is invoked to justify the expansion of its security sphere through what is known as “forward defense” and “strategic depth”— that is, the displacement of tensions beyond its borders through indirect tools and networks of influence. Here, a vicious cycle takes shape: a doctrine that presumes constant threat produces policies of expansion and escalation, and these policies, in turn, reaffirm and reinforce that very doctrine.

In the same context, another important paradox emerges: in terms of its security logic, the Iranian case shares more with the Israeli case than is often assumed. Both stem from a deep perception of geographic or strategic vulnerability and transform this perception into a doctrine that reinterprets the world as a domain of constant threat, thereby justifying preemptive or extraterritorial policies. Yet this similarity remains limited and does not imply equivalence in tools or international position.

Iran relies heavily on networks of non-state actors—such as militias—and on indirect warfare, whereas Israeli doctrine is grounded in direct military superiority and preemptive strikes within a firmly rooted Western alliance structure, even if that structure has shown signs of strain recently.

Moreover, the former tends toward a logic of attrition and long-term patience, while the latter emphasizes decisive and rapid deterrence. Nevertheless, the parallels in threat perception are sufficient to generate a mechanism of mutual escalation, whereby each side reproduces and reinforces the fears of the other. The conflict between them thus appears not merely as a clash of interests, but as an interaction between two security doctrines—similar in logic, yet divergent in practice. For the Gulf states, and Kuwait in particular, a complicated equation arises.

On the one hand, Tehran views Gulf territory as being used, militarily or intelligence-wise, against it, thereby rendering these states part of the threat in its perspective. On the other hand, the Gulf states see themselves in a defensive position, rejecting these accusations and affirming their sovereignty. While the broader picture may suggest that Iran is acting reactively, recent developments reveal a deeper shift in the balance of initiative.

With its capacity to disrupt or threaten navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran has moved from a position of constraint to one of agenda-setting. Indeed, this shift takes Iranian behavior beyond merely posing a threat to maritime traffic, toward attempting to use the international waterway itself as a tool of political and economic pressure. Yet the ability to set the tempo does not necessarily entail the ability to endure over time. The paradox is that, although Iranian strategy is fundamentally oriented toward a logic of attrition and long-term patience, in moments of acute escalation it relies on tools designed to produce immediate shock and rapidly raise costs—not to sustain a prolonged conventional war at the same pace. Tehran, despite possessing effective disruptive capabilities, does not share the same structural vulnerabilities as the Gulf states.

The latter are more exposed to coercion targeting coastal infrastructure and vital maritime routes, whereas Iran faces a different set of pressures, most notably a limited capacity to absorb prolonged disruptions. Accordingly, a protracted conflict could transform Iran’s advantage in disruption into a self-imposed burden, as cumulative costs begin to work against it rather than its adversaries. On another level, the traditional instruments of influence available to the Gulf states no longer translate into political leverage with the same effectiveness under the current turbulence.

Instead, other, more direct tools have come to the fore: control over the operational space of major powers, direct exposure to risk, and the capacity for diplomatic mediation, as they remain among the few actors able to communicate with multiple sides. It is important here to correct the angle of analysis: a state’s endurance in war is not measured by the size of its economy, but by its ability to continue financing vital imports. By this measure, the Gulf states hold a clear advantage—not only due to the strength of their current economies, but also because of the financial reserves that allow them to “buy time.” Iran, by contrast, is far weaker in this regard, making time itself more of a pressure factor against it than a tool in its favor. In an increasingly fragmented international context—as recently reflected in sessions of the UN Security Council—Iran’s room for maneuver is further enhanced.

The absence of international consensus limits the possibility of imposing lasting stability and allows Tehran to operate within an environment that enables the management of crisis rather than its resolution. In this context, former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, offers a notable reading that merits attention. He calls on Iran’s leadership to transform what he considers a “success in resilience” into a political gain through a comprehensive settlement with the United States, based on the principle of reciprocity: nuclear constraints in exchange for sanctions relief, a non-aggression agreement, and the reintegration of Iran into the global economic system. What is striking in his proposal, however, is not only what he says, but what remains unsaid afterall.

Interestingly, absent is any discussion of “forward defense” and the network of regional allies that has formed the core of Iranian strategy for decades. This silence reflects an attempt to reframe Iran as a state capable of integration into formal arrangements, rather than as a power reliant on transnational instruments of infl uence. Recent developments, however, reveal the limits of this approach. The current trajectory does not point toward a comprehensive settlement so much as it reflects a conditional and temporary management of the crisis.

A two-week ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, was announced and tied directly to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and assurances of safe passage. At the same time, Tehran conditioned the arrangement on the cessation of U.S. strikes, guarantees against their recurrence, and compensation for damages—while also reaffirming its rejection of any temporary de-escalation that does not lead to a permanent agreement. This contradiction suggests that what is unfolding does not amount to a strategic transformation in Iranian behavior, but rather a repositioning aimed at consolidating the gains of resilience and managing negotiations from a position of disruption, rather than exiting that logic.

Within this framework, a key question remains open: can Iran transition from a logic of “strategic depth” to one of “cooperative security” without losing one of its most important deterrent tools? Or will this duality persist, with settlements articulated in the language of the state, while instruments of influence are maintained in the language of networks—thereby reproducing the same dilemma rather than resolving it? In light of this divergence, two possible future trajectories can be envisioned.

The first is tension followed by gradual containment, driven by geography, which ultimately imposes coexistence. The second—and more dangerous—is the Gulf’s descent into an arena of competition among major powers. Yet, at its current stage, this possibility remains primarily visible at the level of political alignment rather than an actual shift toward direct conflict within the region. This scenario, however, is not inevitable. The Gulf states, despite their alliance with the United States, are also connected through broad networks of interests with other international powers, granting them room for maneuver: to act as mediators rather than arenas, as players rather than battlegrounds.

Here, Kuwait’s particularity stands out—its history of mediation and its reputation as a balanced actor provide it with the capacity to play a diplomatic role that exceeds its relative size. In the end, the essence of the crisis does not lie in the balance of power alone, but in the nature of the logic through which it is managed: a conflict that is continually reproduced through temporary de-escalation rather than addressed at its root. What we are witnessing is not a settlement, but a recurring cycle of tension, fundamentally driven by a strategy that externalizes crises and expands the security sphere at the expense of regional stability.

Accordingly, any genuine resolution cannot be achieved merely by managing escalation, but requires a rethinking of this very logic—one that turns security into a constant source of instability. By contrast, the Gulf states offer a different model: one that, despite its challenges, prioritizes stability, integration into the global economy, and the use of diplomatic tools rather than the export of crises. This grants them not only the capacity for resilience, but also the ability to shape the direction of the crisis.