24/09/2026
24/09/2026
Look back at the history of Arab normalisation with Israel and ask a simple question: where were the popular movements demanding it before governments made the decision? Where were the demonstrations calling for Israeli embassies to be opened?
The NGOs and unions lobbying for diplomatic relations? The political movements building support around normalisation? It is difficult to find a clear Arab example in which normalisation travelled from the street to the state. More often, it travelled in the opposite direction: from the top down. Governments, of course, have their own calculations. They may be driven by security, economics, regional alliances, relations with Washington or considerations that are not always publicly disclosed. This is nothing unusual in international relations.
The mistake is to confuse the reasons that lead a state to normalise relations with those that might lead a society to embrace them. Egypt signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1979; Jordan followed in 1994. Decades later, their experience suggests that signing a treaty is considerably easier than building popular acceptance of it. That distinction remains visible today. Thirty-two years after Jordan’s peace treaty, King Abdullah II told the United Nations this week that this Israeli government’s “expansionist appetite” had become a “regional threat”, while reaffirming Jordan’s commitment to a just peace.
Therein lies the lesson. A state can change policy, open an embassy, establish direct flights and sign agreements. Foreign policy is made by states. But political decisions cannot, by decree, change deeply held convictions. So the real question is not who will normalise next, or when. It is whether governments can create popular acceptance for a peace their societies did not ask for. States can sign agreements in a moment. Public acceptance cannot be signed into existence.
By Abdulaziz Al-Anjeri
