On the evening of June 5, 1967, President Jamal Abdel Nasser decided that Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer had to go, and thus based his strategy and planning around holding Field Marshal Amer responsible for the defeat. Despite Nasser’s declaration of willingness to assume full responsibility in his resignation speech, this statement proved to be little more than empty rhetoric.
In reality, the Egyptian leader was unwilling to relinquish power, change his governing style, or accept his share of the disaster. Jamal Abdel Nasser crafted his resignation statement with two clear objectives. First, it aimed to garner public sympathy, and second, to maintain popular support. Second, and more importantly, Nasser aimed to remove Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, the Minister of War.
Field Marshal Amer was not an ordinary official who could be dismissed with a simple decree. In fact, Field Marshal Amer’s faction was more powerful than Nasser’s, not only because he controlled the armed forces, but also because he held the positions of Minister of Interior, Director of General Intelligence, and Director of the Military Prison, in addition to his role as Minister of War.
This gave him control over all officials and all security and military facilities. Those overseeing the investigation files were part of Field Marshal Amer’s group and were loyal to him. It was therefore decided that the president would announce his resignation and the field marshal would step down as a tactical move, after which Shams Badran, one of Field Marshal Amer’s most loyal men, would temporarily assume the Ministry of War and the presidency.
According to the agreement between Nasser and Field Marshal Amer, Badran would assume the presidency temporarily until the situation stabilized, after which he would step down and Nasser and Field Marshal Amer would return to their positions. As was their custom, Nasser and Field Marshal Amer orchestrated events as if staging an absurd play. By the grace of God, the play turned into a historic victory. Field Marshal Amer submitted his resignation as agreed. His resignation led all his men to abandon him, convincing themselves that the measure was only temporary and thus avoiding any responsibility. This was how Field Marshal Amer persuaded them, and they were appeased. He then waited to hear a statement in which Nasser would announce his resignation from the presidency.
However, he was surprised to learn that Nasser had nominated Zakaria Mohieddin for the presidency instead of Shams Badran, as they had previously agreed, and sensed that Nasser was about to betray him. Zakaria Mohieddin belonged to the Nasserist faction loyal to Jamal Abdel Nasser, which meant Nasser could control and manipulate him for any plans.
Moreover, it was unlikely that the public would welcome Mohieddin’s nomination, as he was associated in the people’s minds with the price hikes and rising cost of living during his tenure as Prime Minister. Nasser justified his decision at the time by claiming that Zakaria had raised prices to cover the costs of the development plan.
Upon hearing Zakaria Mohieddin’s name, Field Marshal Amer sensed that Nasser was planning to act independently. Meanwhile, another scene was unfolding in the office of Ali Sabri, a Nasser loyalist and a rival of Field Marshal Amer. Sabri served as the intermediary between the Soviets and Nasser and had enjoyed Nasser’s trust for years prior to the July 23 Revolution. He had previously held positions as head of intelligence and Prime Minister.
At that time, Ali Sabri was the Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Union, the main figure responsible for mobilization and mass gatherings, and an expert in planning and operations. Prior to the resignation announcement, Ali Sabri was preparing a populist mobilization, which involved trucks carrying thousands of Arab Socialist Union members. According to Sabri’s plan, the trucks and buses were deployed to main squares and intersections, carrying banners wrapped in cloth and numerous pictures of the president.
The Arab Socialist Union committees replicated the plan in all governorates. The late President Anwar Sadat later referred to the Arab Socialist Union as “the inflated balloon.” Immediately after Nasser announced his resignation, members of the Arab Socialist Union took to the streets, carrying pre-prepared banners reading “Don’t resign” and holding hundreds of pictures of Nasser. The popular uprising was thus unleashed, following a plan influenced by Soviet mobilization strategies. This uprising was designed to mobilize the largest segment of the population, bringing people into the streets to demand exactly what the authorities intended.
In a speech, the late President Hosni Mubarak said he could have pretended to resign, only to have people demonstrate and demand that he stay in office, but he refused to do this, as he believed it would have ruined the country. He recalled the Nasserists’ demands that Zakaria Mohieddin refuse the presidency and that Nasser remain in office, with crowds chanting, “Refuse, refuse, Zakaria! Nasser is the best.”
The security forces did not intervene or confront the street protesters. On the contrary, they acted with unusual leniency and restraint, encouraging the crowds to grow. This coincided with radio announcers urging people to remain in the streets and protest the president’s resignation. Patriotic and stirring songs were broadcast, directed at threatening the enemy and heightening public fervor.
As a result, the human tide surged through the streets of Egypt. The same scene was repeated in other countries, where people demanded that the defeated leader remain in power, inspired by the fervor that had gripped the Egyptians.
