Many Persian theorists, particularly nationalists, view Arabic words as “evidence of impurity” or as an attempt to “Arabize” Iranian identity. They therefore link the Arabic language with official Islam and the historical political and sectarian dominance of the Arabs. They consider replacing Arabic words with ancient or newly coined Persian equivalents a symbolic act aimed at restoring pre-Islamic Iranian civilization or severing the psychological connection with Arab rule.
Recently, the Parsig movement, composed of diaspora groups, used social media to circulate and promote lists of pure Persian vocabulary and advocate abandoning Arabic words. Most of the words they propose date back to the Sasanian era. They have replaced traditional greetings for meeting and parting with “darud” instead of “salam.” Many of these alternatives were already present in Classical Persian.
However, the dominance of Arabic vocabulary over recent centuries has made them less common, prompting language purification movements to revive or promote them in modern writing. In everyday usage in Iran, Arabic words remain widespread. Alternative terms appear mainly in nationalist writings, certain media outlets, diaspora activism, and social media. There are also voices within Iran that criticize the myth of a pure Persian language. They argue that Arab-Persian interaction was reciprocal and profound, and that Arabic words have become an integral part of the Persian language, just as Persian has influenced Arabic. Therefore, the Pahlavi Cultural Institute did not officially codify the language or coin new Persian words.
Rather, it tended to favor Persian roots. The Institute had no serious intention or radical project to eliminate all Arabic words; instead, it focused primarily on replacing modern European terms and favoring Persian over Arabic. What we are witnessing is not a purely spontaneous linguistic phenomenon, but rather an extension of a language-purification movement with a nationalist and political character. This movement uses the revival of ancient Persian words as a symbol of rejecting the influence of Arabic and Islam on Iranian cultural identity. Another problem facing Iran is the ideological nature of its political project and its limited ambitions, despite the fact that the revolution’s slogan and constitution indirectly reflect an aspiration to export the revolution and spread a form of vengeful Shi’ism intertwined with Persian nationalist tendencies.
Therefore, the regime has turned to Shiite minorities who have long complained of oppression, invoking calls for revenge, promoting the idea of the imminent return of the Mahdi to eliminate infidels and traitors, and advocating the liberation of Palestine by establishing control over as many Arab capitals as possible. This is what Iran has pursued for many years, sacrificing much of its power and the lives of its people in the process. Iran has made little effort to conceal these ambitions and aspirations since the 1980s. It exploits the hostility of the United States and Israel towards it to justify targeting countries that support the United States. Another obstacle to improving relations between the two sides is the deeply rooted Twelver Shiite belief that the twelfth Imam, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Askari, is still alive and is the awaited Mahdi.
According to Twelver Shiites, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Askari was born in 869 CE in Samarra and has remained alive for nearly 1,200 years, observing world events during his occultation. They believe he will one day reappear to defeat the enemies of Muslims and establish justice on Earth. The Safavids used this belief to motivate their soldiers during wartime, convincing them that the Mahdi would support them in their conflicts with their Russian and Ottoman enemies.
The anticipated reappearance of the Mahdi has become part of the cultural heritage of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Among segments of the Iranian public, recent events and the prospect of an American attack are increasingly interpreted as signs of the Mahdi’s imminent return. The Iranian regime derives its legitimacy by reinforcing this possibility and asserting its authority to rule on the Mahdi’s behalf through the doctrine of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih). It is therefore natural to believe that the Mahdi will not allow the regime to be defeated and will crush any external or internal threats. The current regime’s role is to preserve Iran and ultimately hand it over to the “Awaited Mahdi” upon his reappearance. These beliefs may become more deeply entrenched as the threat of all-out war recedes, or weaken if the regime experiences decline or collapse.
By Ahmad alsarraf
email: [email protected]
email: [email protected]
