In an interview on The Black Box TV show, Abdullah Al-Nafisi stated that the government’s departure from Kuwait on the first day of the Iraqi invasion, along with its call for citizens to resist, broadcast via a makeshift radio station mounted on a pickup truck, represented a form of chaos. Al-Nafisi’s remarks clearly distort both logic and historical events. The government’s successful evacuation from Kuwait on the first day of the invasion was considered a crushing defeat for Saddam Hussein and one of his first fatal mistakes.
The evacuation was not merely about preserving lives but it was also about safeguarding the government’s legitimacy, ensuring the continuity of leadership, and maintaining its authority to act on behalf of the nation, thereby providing the necessary legitimacy for the decisions that ultimately led to liberation. Historically, the withdrawal of armies from the battlefield has turned into a victory. A prime example is the evacuation from Dunkirk at the beginning of World War II, which saved approximately 338,000 British, French, and Belgian soldiers from certain death at the hands of German forces. That withdrawal became a victory in its own right and enabled Britain to continue the war. Washington’s army’s withdrawal from Brooklyn in 1776, crossing the East River at night before being besieged, was considered a major success at a critical juncture in the American Revolution against the British.
There are many other withdrawals that history records with pride, including the Battle of Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War in 1950, carried out by United Nations forces. Examples from ancient history include the Byzantine withdrawal from the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 and Khalid ibn al-Walid’s withdrawal from the Battle of Mu’tah in 629 CE after the deaths of his three commanders and the overwhelming superiority of the Byzantine forces and their allies. The withdrawal allowed Khalid ibn al-Walid to reorganize his army and withdraw it from the battlefield, preventing its annihilation. The Russian army withdrew before Napoleon in 1812 and subsequently managed to wear down the French army. The Soviet army also withdrew from some areas of the Eastern Front in 1941 in the face of the German advance.
These organized withdrawals helped buy time, implement new policies, save the main force from encirclement or annihilation, and preserve leadership and troop morale. The withdrawing armies gained valuable time to call in reinforcements or build new defenses while retaining the capacity to wage subsequent battles, whether political or military. There are well-known instances of political leaders fleeing their countries after an invasion, with their departure helping preserve legitimacy and ultimately reclaim the invaded nation. A prime example is Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait 36 years ago, when the legitimate government successfully sought refuge in Saudi Arabia, thereby maintaining international recognition and legal representation and providing the Allied forces with the necessary legitimacy to retake the country militarily. After the fall of France to Germany in 1940, General de Gaulle fled to Britain, declared the continuation of the fight, and led Free France.
When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, Emperor Haile Selassie went into exile and continued to advocate for his country’s independence before the League of Nations. After Germany invaded the Netherlands in 1940, Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch government fled to Britain, where they continued to issue statements and support the Dutch resistance and the Allied forces. The same thing happened in Norway, where King Haakon rejected the German-appointed government and sought refuge in Britain. This pattern was repeated after Germany invaded and partitioned Yugoslavia. The King of Greece and his government fled to Egypt and then Britain in 1941, where they continued to support the resistance and its eventual victory. Therefore, the Kuwaiti government’s evacuation to Saudi Arabia on the night of the invasion was a brilliant tactical decision. Had it not occurred, the same critics would likely not have hesitated to blame the government for failing to leave.
By Ahmad alsarraf
email: [email protected]
email: [email protected]
