South Korea offers a similar precedent. Park Chung-hee seized power in a military coup in 1961 and governed until his assassination in 1979. His rule delivered rapid economic growth alongside authoritarian control and restricted freedoms. Despite this legacy, his daughter, Park Geunhye, won the presidency in 2012 after years of institutional political engagement. Iran’s case, however, differs fundamentally.

In both the Philippine and South Korean examples, the political comeback was preceded by sustained domestic political work, organizational structures, and gradual integration into the political system. This groundwork provided credibility and operational readiness.

Reza Pahlavi lacks such foundations. After nearly five decades outside Iran, he has not built a coherent domestic political base or an organizational framework capable of translating symbolic appeal into effective political power. His presence relies heavily on media visibility and international engagements rather than on a structured political project inside Iran.

Several high-profile interviews have revealed inconsistencies in messaging and limited capacity to address complex issues with professional rigor, raising doubts about his capabilities and preparedness as a political leader. According to multiple research assessments, his strongest support remains concentrated within segments of the Iranian diaspora rather than inside Iran itself. Yet political history rarely operates on permanent exclusions.

Societies do not always vote based on ideal choices, but often on what appears feasible under pressure. When systems stagnate and alternatives erode, symbolic figures can unexpectedly regain relevance. It is therefore not impossible that a Pahlavi could one day return to power. But absent credible domestic organization, political depth, and institutional readiness, such a scenario remains speculative rather than strategically grounded.