China’s Middle East security proposal: credibility vs. capability

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s four-point proposal for a new Middle East security architecture deserves more attention. Unveiled during his talks in Cairo, the proposal rests on what Beijing calls “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.” It argues that regional security arrangements should be shaped from within the Middle East, that the region’s conflicts must be addressed as interconnected rather than isolated crises, and that the Palestinian issue cannot be pushed aside. It also links long-term stability to economic development and secure maritime routes, while calling for respect for the UN Charter, national sovereignty and an end to foreign interference and double standards.

This is not a proposal for a China-led military alliance, nor is Beijing offering to replace the American security umbrella. It is making a more fundamental argument: the rules governing Middle Eastern security should not be written by outside powers alone. That argument merits a serious hearing. The US-led order has provided several countries in the region with deterrence and security guarantees that China is not currently capable of matching.

At the same time, it has failed to prevent repeated wars or produce a regional order broadly accepted by the parties expected to live under it. Washington also enjoys an advantage that is often overlooked. Decades of political engagement and extensive media relationships have given the United States far greater ability to explain, defend and promote its policies across the Arab world. China’s economic footprint may be expanding, but its engagement with the region’s societies remains comparatively limited. That distance often makes Beijing’s intentions appear more opaque than its record alone would suggest. The numbers complicate the conventional picture. Since the People’s Republic of China took its seat on the UN Security Council in 1971, Beijing has used its veto roughly 20 times.

The United States has used it approximately 89 times, with more than half of those vetoes linked to shielding Israel or blocking measures concerning its conduct. The contrast extends beyond the Security Council. The United States has used military force without explicit UN authorization in Grenada, Panama, Kosovo and Iraq.

More recently, a US military operation captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and transferred him to the United States, while American and Israeli forces jointly launched strikes against Iran. China’s record is not beyond criticism. Beijing has repeatedly joined Moscow in vetoing draft Security Council resolutions. It should therefore not be presented as an impartial guardian of international law.

Still, China’s relative restraint gives its criticism of foreign intervention a measure of credibility. The widening gap between America’s stated principles and some of its actions has made sections of Arab public opinion and the region’s policy community more willing to consider what Beijing has to offer. Credibility, however, is not the same as capability. Avoiding military intervention does not by itself create a viable security order. Conversely, military superiority does not guarantee lasting political legitimacy.

The Middle East should not be forced to choose between Washington and Beijing. The more useful question is what China can add to the existing security landscape and whether its proposal can complement current guarantees without turning the region into another arena for great-power rivalry. Regional ownership and common security are not new ideas.

What is new is the possibility that a major power may invest sufficient political and economic weight to move them from theory into serious diplomacy. China maintains relationships with governments and movements that often refuse to speak to one another. That gives Beijing an opportunity few others possess.

President Xi’s proposal should therefore be welcomed as a starting point, not treated as a finished blueprint or an invitation to align against the United States. If China is prepared to support it with practical mechanisms, sustained diplomacy and credible assurances for smaller states, it could become a serious contribution to a more stable Middle East.

By Abdulaziz Al-Anjeri